Abstract. We present a protocol for sending data over a common class of low-bandwidth covert channels. Covert channels exist in most communications systems and allow individuals to communicate truly undetectably. H o wever, covert channels are seldom used due to their complexity. Our protocol is both practical and secure against attack b y p o werful adversaries. We implement our protocol on a standard platform (Linux) exploiting a channel in a common communications system (TCP timestamps).
Introduction
A covert channel is a communications channel which allows information to be transferred in a way that violates a security policy. As a result, covert channels are important methods of censorship resistance. An e ective covert channel is undetectable by the adversary and can provide a strong degree of privacy. Often the fact that secret communication is taking place between parties is extremely revealing.
Consider the prisoners' problem, rst formulated by Simmons 17] . Alice and Bob are in prison attempting to plan an escape. They are allowed to communicate, but a Warden watches all of their communications. If the Warden notices that they are planning to escape or even suspects them of trying to communicate secretly, they will be placed in solitary con nement.
The prisoners' problem is theoretically interesting and provides a good explanation of the problem that covert channels solve, this problem is increasingly relevant i n r e a l w orld situations. Many g o vernments provide restrictions on the use of cryptography on their systems. The situation is particularly extreme in China, where all ISPs are subject to government control, although electronic systems are increasingly subject to surveillance in all parts of the world as attempts to integrate Carnivore monitoring systems 7] in U.S. ISPs has shown. Private companies increasingly monitor and censor communications with rewalls.
An e ective c o vert channel requires several apparently contradictory properties.
{ Randomness -In order for the channel to be undetectable, the bits in which data is sent must be random, otherwise the high entropy signature of encrypted data will be noticed.
{ Indispensability -The channel must be something which an adversary cannot or will not close o , usually due to the fact that it serves some useful function to the users which are not sending covert data. TCP timestamps are useful for this purpose because they satisfy these properties to a high degree.
{ TCP is ubiquitous protocol used all over the world for the majority of all Internet tra c. It is almost always employed using the timestamp option. As a result, it is extremely plausible that the majority of users using TCP will not be sending covert data and have a good reason for using it.
{ On a slow connection, the low order bits of timestamps appear random. As a result, statistical analysis of the headers of the packet will be ine ective i n detecting the channel.
{ Since TCP is so widely employed, it is likely that users who are not sending covert data would react unfavorably to attempts to modify their TCP packets on a large scale or to limit the timestamp option which i s u s e d t o e n s u r e h i g h performance.
The channel is broken if it is detected by the adversary. This situation can be modeled as follows: For any two TCP connections t 1 and t 2 on the same network, an adversary cannot distinguish which of the connections is using with probability greater than 1 2 . T h e c hannel is also broken if the adversary can deny service to the users of the covert channel while still allowing service to the users of unmodi ed TCP connections.
The adversary has the power to monitor all the tra c on the network and to modify some tra c. The adversary only views network tra c and cannot see the processing of packets on sender and receiver machines. We consider an eavesdropper who has the power to modify any n umber of packets, but cannot constantly modify packets sent b y a single host.
In the prisoners' analogy, t h e w arden would not be constantly changing every message which passes between prisoners, but might occasionally modify some messages in the hopes of detecting covert communication. The warden lacks the resources to modify every message sent b e t ween every prisoner all of the time. If the warden was su ciently suspicious of one prisoner to modify all of their messages, he would just put that prisoner in solitary and be done with it.
It is notable to realize that if a more powerful adversary than this is willing and capable of either preventing users from using the timestamp option with TCP or overwriting the low order bits of TCP timestamps of every packet, then the adversary will have closed the channel. We assume that the adversary is either unwilling to do this, unable to do this, or will be annoyed by being forced to do this. In addition, we believe t h a t e v en if this channel is closed, the techniques presented in this paper will be useful in providing reliable communication over other low bandwidth covert channels. It is also useful to realize that even if the adversary denies service to the channel, he still cannot detect whether covert data was being sent regardless of how m uch data he modi es or snipes.
Most of the interesting work which w e h a ve done deals with the problem of sending a message at a rate of one bit per packet over an unreliable channel, and we believe that even if this particular channel is closed the work we h a ve done will be relevant to other similar channels that may be identi ed.
Related Work
Many other channels have been ident i e d i n T C P . These include initial sequence numbers, acknowledged sequence numbers, windowing bits and protocol identication. 13] 19] These papers focus on nding places where covert data could potentially be sent but do not work out the details of how to send it. Those implementations which exist 13] generally place into header elds values that are incorrect, unreasonable or even outside the speci cation. As long as the adversary is not looking, this may be e ective, but it will stand up to concerted attack, being e ectively security through obscurity. These systems do cannot withstand statistical analysis.
The TCP protocol is described in RFC 793. 12] A security analysis TCP/IP can be found in 3] We are certainly not the rst group of people to identify the possibility of using the TCP/IP Protocol Suite for the purposes of transmitting covert data. In \Covert Channels in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite," 13] Craig Rowland describes the possibility of passing covert data in the IP identi cation eld, the initial sequence number eld, and the TCP acknowledge Sequence Number Field. He wrote a simple proof-of-concept, raw-socket implementation covert tcp.c. The possibility of hiding data in timestamps is not discussed. We feel that embedding data in the channels identi ed here would not be su cient to hide data from an adversary who suspected that data might b e h i d d e n i n t h e TCP stream. In \IP Checksum Covert Channels and Selected Hash Collision," 1] the idea of using internet protocol checksums for covert communication is discussed. Techniques for detecting covert channels, as well as possible places to hide data in the TCP stream, are discussed (the sequence numbers, duplicate packets, TCP window size and the urgent pointer) in the meeting notes of the UC Davis Denial of Service(DOS) Project 19] The idea of using timing information for covert channels (in hardware) is described in \Countermeasures and Tradeo s for a Class of Covert Timing Channels." 8] More generalized use of timing channels for sending covert information is described in \Simple Timing Channels. " 10] Covert channels are discussed more generally in a variety of papers. A generalized survey of information-hiding techniques is described in \Information Hiding { A Survey." 6] Theoretical issues in information hiding are considered in 4] and 2]. John McHugh provides a wealth of information on analyzing a system for covert channels in \Covert Channel Analysis. " 9] . The subject is addressed mainly in terms of classi ed systems. These sorts of channels are also analyzed in \Covert Channels { Here to Stay? " 11] . These papers focus on the prevention of covert channels in system design and detecting those that already exist, rather than exploiting them. G.J. Simmons has done a great deal of research into subliminal channels 17] 15] 14] 16]. He was the rst to formulate the problem of covert communication in terms of the prisoners' problem, did substantial work on the history of subliminal communication { in particular in relation to compliance with the SALT t r e a t y and identi ed a covert channel in the DSA.
Design

Goals
The goal of this system is to covertly send data from one host to another host. There are two important parts to this goal. First, we m ust send data. Second, we m ust be covert (i.e. only do things that our adversary could not detect).
It is important to note that these two goals are at odds with each other. In order to send data, we must do things that the receiving host can detect. However, in order to be covert, we m ust not do anything that an eavesdropper can detect.
We approach this problem by presuming the existence of a covert channel that meets as few requirements as possible. We then describe a protocol to use such a c hannel to send data. Finally, w e i d e n tify a covert channel that meets the requirements that we h a ve proposed.
Characteristics of the Channel
In designing our covert channel protocol, we seek to identify the minimum requirement s f o r a c hannel which w ould allow us to send useful data.
In the worst case scenario, the channel would be bitwise lossy, unacknowledged, and the bits sent w ould be required to pass certain statistical tests. By bitwise lossy, w e mean the channel can drop and reorder individual bits. By unacknowledged, we mean that the sender does not know what bits, if any, w ere dropped and does not know what order the bits arrived in.
Using this channel to send data is extremely di cult. However, if we relax these restrictions in reasonable ways, the problem becomes clearly tractable.
For simplicity, w e will assume that the only statistical test that the bits must pass is one of randomness, since this will be convenient f o r e m bedding encrypted data. This is reasonable since it is not prohibitively di cult to identify covert channels that normally (i.e. when they are not being used to send covert data) contain an equal distribution of ones and zeros.
We will also assume that each bit has a nonce attached to it and that if the bit is delivered, it arrives with its nonce intact. This condition is both su cient to make the channel usable to send data and likely to be met by m a n y c o vert channels in network protocols. The reason why it is an easy condition to meet is that most covert channels in network protocols involve e m bedding one or more bits of covert data in a packet of innocuous data. Thus, the innocuous data (or some portion thereof) can serve as the nonce.
Assumptions
We presume that we h a ve a c hannel with the above c haracteristics. We f u r t h e r presume that the adversary cannot detect our use of that channel. Lastly, we presume a shared secret exists between the sender and receiver.
The rst two presumptions will be justi ed in sections 3.5 and 5.1 respectively. The third presumption is justi ed on the grounds that it is impossible to solve the problem without it. This is the case because if the sender and receiver did not have a shared secret, there would be nothing to distinguish the receiver from the adversary. A n y message that the sender could produce that was detectable by the receiver could be detected by t h e a d v ersary in the same manner. Note that public key cryptography is no help here, because any k ey negotiation protocol would still require sending a message to the receiver that anyone could detect.
We also, assume that it is su cient to implement a best e ort datagram service, such as that provided (non-covertly) by t h e I n ternet Protocol. In such a service, packets of data are delivered with high probability. The packets may still be dropped or reordered but, if a packet reaches its destination, all the bits in the packet reach the destination and the order of the bits within the packet is preserved. This level of service is su cient because the techniques to implement reliability o ver unreliable datagrams are well understood, and in some applications reliability m a y not be required.
We n o w present a method to implement best e ort datagrams over a channel with the above c haracteristics.
Protocol
In order to send messages over this channel, we send one bit of our message block M per bit of the channel, rather than sending some function of multiple bits. This way, each bit of the data is independent and if one bit is lost or reordered it will not a ect the sending of any of the other bits. We choose which bit of the message block t o send based on a keyed hash of the nonce. That is, for a message block of size l and a key K , on the packet with nonce t we send bit numbern where
The hash function H should be a cryptographic hash function which is collision-free and one-way. Because the nonce T will vary with time, which b i t we send will be a random distribution over the l bits in the block. We c a n k eep track of which b i t s h a ve been sent in the past, in order to know when we h a ve sent all the bits. The expected number of channel bits x it takes to send the l bits of the block will be Of course, because our channel loses bits, this is not su cient. We thus send each bit more than once, calling the number of times we send each bit the occupation number of that bit, o. The probability of our message getting through, p, will be based on the probability that a bit is dropped d and the occupation numbero. The probability will be bounded below b y ( 1 ; d o ) l . T h us for any drop rate, we c a n c hoose a su ciently high occupation number to assure that our messages will get through. And for small drop rates the occupation number does not need to be large to for the probability of successful transmit to be high.
When sending each bit, it must have t h e same statistical properties as the covert channel has when not being used or else an adversary could use statistical analysis to detect the use of the channel. As we mentioned above, we assume that the channel is normally random. Thus, our bits must appear random. Since much research has been done in nding cryptographic means to make ciphertexts indistinguishable from random distributions, this will be easy. We accomplish this as follows. We derive a k ey bit k from the same keyed hash of the nonce t in Equation 1, making sure to not correlate n and k.
The transmitted bit b is the exclusive or of the key bit k and the plaintext message bit M n . Because k seems random, M n will seem random, and thus the random characteristic of our channel is preserved. There are several techniques that the sender can use to determine when a bit has been transmitted.
The sender assumes that a block has been transmitted after it has achieved the occupation number o for every bit in the message. In order for the receiver to know when they have received a block, the last l c bits of the message are a checksum C of the rst l ; l c bits.
Finding a Covert Channel
In attempting to locate a covert channel we restrict our considerations to covert channels over the network. This is because most of the time the network is the only mechanism through which a pair of hosts can reasonably communicate.
There are two w ays that we could transmit information. We could send new packets and try to make them look innocuous, or we could modify existing packets. Obviously, i t will be easier to maintain covertness if we modify existing packets. If we were to send new packets, we would need to come up with a mechanism to generate innocuous looking data. If an adversary knew what this mechanism was, they could likely detect our fake innocuous data and our communication would no longer be covert. In contrast, if we modify packets, all packets that get sent are legitimate packets and an adversary will have a more di cult time detecting that anything is amiss. Thus, we c hoose to modify existing packets.
We can modify existing packets in two w ays. We can modify the application data or we can modify the protocol headers. Modifying the application data requires a detailed understanding of the type of data sent b y a wide variety o f applications. Care must be taken to ensure that the modi ed data could have been generated by a legitimate application, and we must guess what sort of applications the adversary considers innocuous. It is easier and more general to modify the protocol headers because there are fewer network protocols in existence than application protocols. Most applications use one of a handful of network protocols. Furthermore, the interpretation of protocol header elds is well de ned, so we can determine if a change to a eld will disrupt the protocol.
The problem remains, however, that we m ust only produce modi ed protocol headers that would normally have been produced by the operating system. For example, we could attempt to modify the least signi cant bit of the window size eld of TCP packets. However, most 32 bit operating systems tend to have window sizes that are a multiple of four. Since our modi cation would produce many window sizes that were not multiples of four, an adversary could detect that we w ere modifying the window size elds. Similarly, w e could attempt to hide data in the identi cation eld of IP packets. However, many operating systems normally generate sequential identi cation eld values, so an adversary could detect the presence of covert data based upon this discrepancy.
For these reasons, we w i s h t o a void directly modifying packet headers. Instead we observe t h a t more subtle modi cations to the operating system's handling of packets can result in a legitimate (and, thus, presumably harder to detect) change in headers. In particular, if we delay the processing of a packet in a protocol with timestamps, we can cause the timestamp to change.
Detecting these delays will likely be very di cult because operating system timing is very complex and depends on many factors that an adversary may n o t be able to measure { other processes running on the machine, when keys are pressed on the keyboard, etc. Thus, this technique for sending information is very di cult to detect.
We n o w look at applying this technique to TCP to create a channel with the properties described above.
TCP Timestamps as a Covert Channel
By imposing slight delays on the processing of selected TCP packets, we can modify the low order bits of their timestamps.
The low b i t of the TCP timestamp, when modi ed in this way, p r o vides a covert channel as described above. The low bit is e ectively random on most connections. The rest of the packet, or some subset, can be our nonce. When examined individually, p a c kets (and thus bits) are not delivered reliably.
Because TCP timestamps are based purely on internal timings of the host, on a slow connection their low bits are randomly distributed. By rewriting the timestamp and varying the timing within the kernel, we c a n c hoose the value of the low bit. As long as we c hoose values with a statistically random distribution, they will be indistinguishable from the unaltered values.
The rest of the TCP headers provides a nonce that is nearly free from repetition. The sequence number sent with a TCP packet is chosen more or less randomly from a 2 32 number space.Thu s , i t i s u n l i k ely to repeat except on retransmission of a packet. Even if it does repeat, the acknowledgment number and window size elds will likely have c hanged. Even if those elds are the same, the high order bits of the timestamp will likely have changed. It is extremely unlikely that all of the headers, including the high order bits of the timestamp, will ever be the same on two p a c kets.
While TCP is a reliable stream protocol, it provides a stream of bytes that are reliably delivered, rather than guaranteeing reliable delivery of individual packets. For example, if two small packets go unacknowledged they may be coalesced into a single larger packet for the purpose of retransmission. As a result, bits associated with the packets can be dropped, when their packets are not resent. Also, because bytes are acknowledged rather than packets, it is often not clear whether a given packet got through, further complicating the question of whether a bit was delivered.
TCP Speci c Challenges
Rewriting TCP timestamps presents some additional challenges over and above a standard implementation of the protocol from Section 3.4. Timestamps must be monotonically increasing. Timestamps must re ect a reasonable progression of time. And when timestamps are rewritten, it can cause the nonce in the rest of the packet to change.
Timestamps must be monotonically increasing. Because timestamps are to re ect the actual passing of time, no legitimate system would produce earlier timestamps for later packets. Were this done, it could be observed by c hecking the invariant that a packet with a larger sequence number in a stream also has a timestamp greater than or equal to other packets in that stream. When rewriting timestamps, we must honor this invariant. As a result, if presented with the timestamp 13 and needing to send the bit 0, we must rewrite to 14 rather than 12. Additionally, w e m ust make sure than any f o l l o wing packet has a timestamp of not less than 14, even if the correct timestamp might still be 12.
Timestamps must re ect a reasonable progression of time. Though timestamps are implementation dependent and their low order bits random, the progression of the higher order bits must re ect wall clock time in most implementations. Because an adversary can be presumed to know the implementation of the unmodi ed TCP stack, they are aware of what the correct values of timestamps are. In order to send out packets with modi ed timestamps, and keep timestamps monotonically increasing, streams must be slowed so that the timestamps on packets are valid when they are sent. Thus, we can be thought o f a s not rewriting timestamps but as delaying packets.
As an additional challenge, because we must only increase timestamps, we will sometimes cause the high order bits of the timestamp to change. To decrease the chance of nonce repetition, we include the higher-order bits of the timestamp in the nonce. When incrementing timestamps, these bits may c hange, and the nonce will change. When the nonce changes, we w i l l h a ve to recompute n and k, and thus may h a ve to further increment the timestamp. However, at this point the low bit of the timestamp will be 0, and so incrementing will not change the nonce. This algorithm can be seen in Figure 1. 
Choosing Parameters for TCP
Fo r a c hecksum of size n bits, a collision can be expected one time in 2 n . Assuming a sustained packet rate of ten packets per second (an upper bound), we will see a collision every 2 n 10 seconds. We selected our checksum to be a multiple of eight and a power of two t o k eep the checksum byte aligned and to make i t consistent with standard hash functions. A checksum size of 16 bits is clearly too small, as it results in collisions every two hours. A 32 bit checksum raises this time to 13.5 years, which w e deem to be an acceptable without making the amount of data per block too small.
Implementation
Sending Messages
Our sender is implemented on top of the Linux kernel. The current implementation of a sender is a minor source modi cation to provide a hook to rewrite timestamps, and a kernel module to implement the rewrite process, to track t h e current transmission, and to provide access to the covert channel messaging to applications. The current system only provides one channel to one host at a time, but generalizing to multiple channels should not be di cult.
We selected SHA1 as the hash. It is a standard hash function, believed to be collision resistant and one-way. Source is freely available 5], which made it even more attractive. We needed to put our own interface on SHA1 and modify the code so that it could be used in both the kernel code and in the receiving application.
The basic algorithm is for each packet compute the cipher text bit to be included in that packet according to Figure 2 . Then the timestamp is rewritten according to the method described in Figure 1 . This is a simple function implementing the rewriting algorithm described in Section 3.7. This algorithm can be seen in the pseudocode of Figure 3 , particularly in the recursive c a l l t o EncodePacket.
To encode a packet, the timestamp is incremented until it has the proper value to be sent. When a packet is ready to be sent, the occupation numberfor the bit in the packet is increased. Occupation numbers are tracked in the array TransmitCount. If the minimum occupation numberofevery bit in the block i s ever higher than the required occupation number, the block is presumed received and the next block begins transmission.
Receiving Messages
The receiving process is designed to be portable and entirely located in userspace. It is much simpler than the sender side and the primary interesting part is Packets are collected by the receiver using the libpcap interface to the Berkeley Packet Filter 18]. This library is part of the standard utility tcpdump and has been ported to a wide variety of platforms. Our receiver is simple C, using only libpcap and our SHA1 library. Unlike the sender, it is not tied to the Linux platform, and will probably run anywhere that libpcap will run.
The receiver maintains a bu er initialized to all zeroes which represents the current data block to be decoded. As packets are received, the receiver computes the hash of the packet headers concatenated with the shared secret. He then XORs bit 8 of the hash with the low order bit of the timestamp of the packet, he places the result in the bu er at the place indicated by the index.
In actuality, the data block contains less than BLOCKSIZE bits of data. Appended to it is a checksum of the data. The purpose is the checksum is to inform the receiver when he has received the entire valid block and should output plaintext and allocate a new block bu er. The receiver calculates this hash every time he receives a bit and adds it to the bu er. This checksum needs to be collision resistant s u c h that the probability t h a t the receiver will believe he has prematurely found a valid output without actually having done so (either by c hance or design by the adversary) is su ciently low.
Evaluation
Security
The security of this protocol is violated when an adversary can determine what data we are sending or that we are sending data at all.
Two things contribute to the low order bit of the timestamp: the plain text bit and the key bit. Given a random oracle model for the hash function used by the sender, the key bit will be a random number provided that packet headers do not collide.
Packet headers collide only when all TCP header elds are the same, including sequence number, window, ags, options, source port, destination port, and the high-order 31 bits of the timestamp the odds of such a collision happening are remarkably small. As long as no such collisions occur, the XOR of the plain text bit with the key bit is essentially a one-time pad. (The low order 9 bits of the hash will collide approximately once every 512 packets, but the adversary h a s n o w ay to detect these collisions without the key.)
Should headers collide, one bit of information is revealed about the two b i t s of plain text encoded in those two packets. Even so, no information is gained about the sender's secret key 1 .
Of course, the adversary does not need to determine precisely what we a r e sending, merely that we are, in fact, sending data. The adversary can detect our 1 This assumes that the hash function used is one-way. channel if the low order bit of the timestamp is non-random or the mean time between packets varies noticeably from the expected value.
The low order bit of the timestamp is generated, as previously discussed, with what may be treated as a random one-time pad, so it will appear random.
Performance
After sending 3000 packets, there is a 99.6% chance that we h a ve s e n t e v ery bit at least once. After sending 5000 packets the probability t h a t w e h a ve not sent every bit has dropped to around 1 in a million. Even if we a s s u m e t h a t 3000 packets may seem like a lot but a single hit on an elaborate website can generate 100 packets or more, especially if the site has many images which must be fetched with individual HTTP GET requests. Furthermore, transfer of a 3 megabyte le will likely generate that many packets. Thus, it is fairly easy to generate enough packets to assure a fairly high probability of successful transmission of a data block.
To send a total of n bits, the message will take a p p r o ximately n 3:75 ms if the sender is not limited by network constraints. 6 Conclusion and Future Directions
Conclusions
We h a ve designed a protocol which is applicable to a variety o f l o w bandwidth, lossy covert channels. The protocol provides for the probabilistic transmission of data blocks.
Identifying potential covert channels is easier than working through the details of sending data covertly and practically through them. The protocol gives a method for sending data over newly identi ed cover channels with minimal design investment. The implementation of this protocol with TCP timestamps is not yet complete, but we are con dent that there are no major obstacles remaining.
Future Directions
Future directions of our research i n volve improvements to our implementation and work on channel design that deals with more powerful adversaries and more diverse situations.
It would be useful if the sender in the implementation were able to track, possible via ack messages, which data had actually been received by the receiver. If this were the case, the sender would not have to rely on probability to decide when a message had gotten through and when he should begin sending more data.
It would also be useful to develop a bidirectional protocol that provided reliable data transfer. Although it would theoretically be possible to implement something like TCP on top of our covert channel, this would likely be ine cient. Thus, it would be useful to develop a reliability protocol speci cally for this type of channel.
We w ould also like to identify channels which a resource rich a c t i v e a d v ersary would not be able to close. It would also be useful to deal with key exchange, as our sender and receiver may n o t h a ve the opportunity to obtain a shared secret.
Our system is currently only practical for short messages it would be desirable to be able to send more data. Lastly, our protocol is designed to work between two parties. It would be interesting to design a broadcast channel such that messages could be published covertly.
